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Abstract 
 
How do we arrest the decline of the social sciences in Pakistan? Is it a matter of money or one of 
sending more students to the West who might then return to teaching at the local universities? In 
this article I argue that the solution lies elsewhere. Borrowing frames, concepts, and analytical 
techniques based on the concept of universalism runs a serious risk of imposing alien views on local 
problems. Moreover, attempts to become ‘scientific’ require side stepping value judgments of good and 
bad. The current Western domination of the intellectual scene favours a single route for social science 
development, and kills all diversity. However, whilst we may borrow as much as we choose, we need 
to build our own frames that would underpin the social sciences, and this is possible only by 
reconnecting with our own past. 
Introduction 
Many authors have lamented the state of social sciences in Pakistan (e.g. Nadeem-ul-
Haque (2007) or Inayatullah et. al. (2005). The HEC has also taken note of the lack 
of significant research, shortage of suitably trained faculty, and created a Committee 
for Development of Social Sciences and Humanities to find remedies. However, 
before rushing to solutions, I believe we must take time out for an accurate 
diagnosis. It has happened all too often that impatient activists have not taken out 
sufficient time to pause for diagnosis, and have ended up administering the wrong 
medicine in their haste.  
Why is the state of social sciences going from bad to worse in Pakistan? A simple 
answer, often given, is that there is no money in it. The argument goes as follows: 
our best and brightest students traditionally chose to study Engineering and 
Medicine, because these professions offered the best prospects. When MBA’s and 
Computer Sciences started to pay, degrees in these areas also became popular. When 
Social Scientists start earning well, we will get more enrollments and attract better 
faculty, and generally improve the state of affairs. Those with market-oriented views, 
especially popular among economists, believe that market prices are socially optimal. 
That is, low wages for social science means that social sciences are not very valuable 
or productive for society. If this is so, then there is no problem to fix.  We should 
not invest resources in areas that are not very productive or valuable. Several 
prominent educationists have expressed the sentiment that developing countries 
cannot afford to waste resources on philosophy, literature or soft sciences – these 
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luxuries can only be afforded by the rich. We must concentrate on science, 
technology, infrastructure etc. as the route to riches.  
This diagnosis suggests that we treat the problem with benign neglect. This is not 
only naïve, but dangerously wrong. In fact, the poor health of the social sciences is 
an extremely serious problem, solving it is a high priority issue, and our approach to 
the solution will significantly impact the future of Pakistan. At the same time, the 
problem is complex and multi-dimensional, and solutions will require coordinated 
efforts on several fronts to succeed. In Education in Pakistan, Qureshi (1975) 
described the historical process, which led to rote-learning, and a meaningless 
education system aimed only at getting jobs, rather than advancing learning and 
creating the thrill of advancing the frontiers of knowledge. In this short article, it is 
not possible for me to discuss all of these various dimensions. Instead I focus on 
just one aspect, namely the extent to which we should borrow from Western social 
sciences to improve the state of affairs in Pakistan.   
Western Universalism 
During the historical phase called ‘the Enlightenment’ of the West, the idea that all 
societies follow the same trajectory was born. The West was the most advanced and 
developed of all societies. Other societies were primitive and under-developed. As 
these other societies matured and grew, they would follow the same stages that were 
followed by the West, and eventually become like modern Western societies. Early 
thinkers like Comte (1855), and more recent ones like Rostow (1978), described the 
stages in growth from primitive society to modern ones in a ‘logical’ sequence. This 
set of ideas is called “Western Universalism.” The term ‘developing country,’ which 
has replaced ‘under-developed country’ also reflects this idea; see Wallerstein (2006).  
Social science is the study of human experience. It attempts to find patterns 
displayed, and commonalities in human interactions in small and large groups. The 
idea of Western universalism suggests that the Western experience is relevant for all 
of humanity – any patterns and commonalities of European history will eventually 
be found in all societies as they develop. In this case, even though social science 
developed in the West, it can be universally applied to all societies. 
Substantial evidence has emerged that Western Universalism is wrong. All cultures 
are not essentially the same as primitive Western cultures, nor do they all follow the 
same development trajectories. The attempt to fit all societies onto the European 
pattern leads to clearly recognizable biases known as “Eurocentricism.” Many 
aspects of the European experience are unique to Europe and were not (and likely 
will not be) experienced by other societies (and vice-versa). Insights of social science 
based on these particular European experiences are peculiar to the West and cannot 
be generalized to other societies. Many authors have documented problems and 
errors resulting from Eurocentricism; see for example, Hodgson and Burke (1993), 
or Marglin (2007). Mitchell (2002, p. 7) writes that “The possibility of social science 
is based upon taking certain historical experiences of the West as the template for a 
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universal knowledge.”  This means that social science as developed in the West is 
Western Social Science, and we cannot safely borrow insights from the West to 
apply to our society, which has an entirely different history, and entirely different set 
of potential future trajectories. 
There are many peculiarities and quirks of European history which have impacted 
on the development of social science in the West. I focus on some of the important 
divergences below. My goal is not to provide a deep analysis of the Western 
experience, but merely to establish that it differs significantly from ours. To the 
extent that this experience impacts on Western formulation of social science, we 
cannot profitably learn from it, and must formulate an understanding of history 
based on our own experiences.  
Western Transition to Secular Thought 
Violent religious conflict, and disenchantment of key intellectuals with religion led 
to the emergence of secular thought in Europe. A brief history is given in 
Pannenberg (1996), while McGee (1948) gives a detailed history for Britain. Instead 
of religious principles, society was to be organized using reason and factual 
knowledge. One problem that immediately emerged was that values could not be 
derived from facts and logic, as Hume recognized early. At the same time, rules and 
regulations were essential for a society to function. There were many attempts to 
find a secular basis for morals; for example The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam 
Smith, and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume. Among 
many approaches, a prominent solution was the “social contract,” a set of rules 
which all members of a society agreed to live by (though this agreement was not 
formal and explicit, and the rules were also not written down or even clearly 
articulated). The ‘rule of law’ and a state empowered to enforce the law became the 
substitute for morality as given by religious rules. Current European political 
thought is firmly based on the social contract.  
There are two major weaknesses of social contract theories. One is that there is no 
absolute basis for morality. Whatever the society agrees as the social contract 
becomes moral. Premarital or extra-marital sex, pedophilia, slavery, bull-fighting, 
boxing, putting out contracts for assassination, torture, etc. may all be considered 
moral or immoral according to majority vote.  The second weakness is that there is 
no inner compulsion on anyone to follow the rules. Unlike the moral code, which is 
binding on individuals by God, and must be followed regardless of whether or not 
someone is watching, the social contract is to be enforced by the law, the courts and 
the government. The realization that the social contract is all that stands between a 
civilized and human society and reversion to barbarism – one cannot assume any 
standards for human moral conduct mandated by religion – led to greater respect 
for artificial, variable, incomplete and often incorrect rules embodied in the code of 
law. The establishment of the ‘rule of law’ in European states did provide a secular 
basis for regulating states and was a tremendous achievement. However the 
weaknesses of the social contract can be  illustrated by noting that in the Western 
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judicial system, justice is an incidental byproduct of a mediated struggle between 
opposing interests. An excellent discussion of the ethical issues is given by a panel 
of lawyers in “A Case of Competing Loyalties” in Stanford Magazine Fall 1983 (p38-
43). All lawyers on the panel agreed that a lawyer defending a male client known to 
him or her to be guilty of rape, nonetheless had the responsibility to destroy the 
reputation of the female victim if this was the best possible defense. All agreed that 
the Western criminal defense system was an adversarial process with artificial 
boundaries, and not a pure search for truth.  
Emergence of Social Sciences in the West 
Manicas (1989) and Gordon (1991) have both written books on different aspects of 
the history and philosophy of social sciences. These provide substantial details on 
European history and how it has influenced the emergence of social sciences.  One 
aspect of this history is Newton’s discovery of gravitation, which was universally 
admired. Many attempts were made to follow his methodology of using one law (or 
an economical set of principles) to explain a large and diverse set of phenomena. 
Economics came closest to this goal in setting up selfishness as the single motive 
which drives humans, and using this to explain all economic phenomena. Mirowski 
(1989) has written on how economics was self-consciously modeled on physics. 
Recent investigations of behavioral economics show that this simplification of 
human behavior is too extreme, and fails to adequately explain many phenomena; 
see, for example, Camerer (2003) or Kagel and Roth (1995). Attachment to the 
mathematical methodology has led to increasing formalism and decreasing relevance 
in modern economic theory. Blaug (1998) cites a leading editor of an economic 
journal, who stated that “.. few economists ask themselves what are the crucial 
economic problems facing society.”  In political science, historical and qualitative 
approaches which recognize the complexity of human behavior have been 
marginalized. The dominant approaches use mathematical approaches based on 
‘rational actor’ models and threatens the earlier classical approach with extinction. In 
recent dialogue and controversy, documented in Perestroika by Monroe (2005), 
political scientists have pleaded for a live and let live approach, to allow both 
traditions to survive. Slavish imitation of Western methodology would lead us to 
reduce humans to selfish automata, and would reduce our understanding of human 
behavior instead of being illuminating about our society.  
Western disenchantment with religion led them to develop a theory of knowledge 
based solely on facts and reason – this has been labeled ‘empiricism’ or ‘positivism.’ 
Superficially, this seems like a very attractive proposition; what else is there, apart 
from facts and reason, on which to base knowledge? Deeper exploration, carried out 
in the West, leads to several difficulties. One difficulty is that values or social norms 
cannot be derived from facts and logic. On the other hand, conduct of social policy 
requires such norms, to differentiate between the good and the bad and to conduct 
policy to achieve the good and avoid the bad. Efforts of social scientists to be 
“scientific” have led to hidden moral values which permeate Western formulations 
and frameworks for social science. These implicit and unexplored background 
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values are often in conflict with traditional values in Pakistan. Foucault’s views on 
this problem have been articulated as follows: “modern human sciences (biological, 
psychological, social) purport to offer universal scientific truths about human nature 
that are, in fact, often mere expressions of ethical and political commitments of a 
particular society. For a specific example, values implicit in the apparently sterile 
mathematical and value-neutral framework of economics have been exposed in 
Nelson (2001), Wilber (2003) and Blaug (1998). In Pakistan we can avoid this 
confusion and conflict, and base social science directly on openly acknowledged and 
commonly agreed upon Islamic values. But to do this would require formulating 
social sciences in a way different from that of Europe.   
Demarcation of social sciences into different fields and setting up of boundaries 
between different fields was also the outcome of particular historical processes in 
the West. Manicas (1989) has given details of competing traditions, and how 
accidents of history led to the dominance of one school of thought over others. He 
has also suggested that as a whole, the ‘wrong’ set of ideas have gained prominence 
in the social sciences, and major difficulties in understanding the world and human 
interactions have emerged as a result. Many have echoed his call. As a simple 
illustration, consider the field demarcation between psychology and economics. 
Economists refuse to consider the issue of how wealth and material goods affect the 
sense of satisfaction, well-being, contentment or happiness that people experience, 
on the ground that these questions belong to the realm of psychology. They 
consider it as part of their profession to only consider how people can become 
wealthy. Recent inter-disciplinary investigations have revealed that attitudes towards 
wealth, methods by which it is acquired, as well as interpersonal dispositions, can 
play an extremely important role in determining the satisfaction obtained by pursuit 
of wealth. Lane (2001) and Layard (2005) have documented how vast increases in 
wealth in Western societies have failed to increase contentment, satisfaction and 
sense of well-being. This has extremely serious consequences for economics – if the 
determined effort being made to increase GNP and wealth has detrimental 
consequences for human welfare, then what is the point of it all? At the very least, 
economists must pay attention to these issues, to ensure that the pursuit of wealth 
has a point in terms of increasing human satisfaction. Recently, the Gulbenkian 
Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Wallerstein 1996) reported 
on the need to change the methodology, approach and field boundaries in Western 
social sciences. It made specific recommendations for different fields based on a 
detailed analysis. 
This situation creates an opportunity for us. There is substantial inertia in Western 
academia which ties them to conventional approaches. Since we have no investment 
in past approaches, we are free to “leapfrog” (like the Japanese did in the steel 
industry) and adopt new approaches to the subject matter. Blaug (1998) has written 
about the dominance of overly mathematical and irrelevant research produced by 
economists in USA and Europe, and how moving back towards relevance is difficult 
because of institutional structures which promote such research. 
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The Fragmentation of Knowledge in the West 
A major problem which affects social sciences acutely is the ‘fragmentation of 
knowledge.’ This has some relation to the previous issue discussed – artificial 
discipline boundaries prevent the synthesis of useful information because different 
pieces lie in different disciplines. Vartan Gregorian (1993), the president of Brown 
University, discusses many of the problems created by this fragmentation: 
specialization, instead of uniting human beings into a general community of 
values and discourse, has by necessity divided them into small and exclusive 
coteries, narrow in outlook and interest. It isolates and alienates human 
beings. Social relations, as a result, cease to be the expression of common 
perceptions and common beliefs; they are reduced to political relations, to 
the interplay of competitive, and often antagonistic, groups. Specialized 
education makes our students into instruments to serve the specialized 
needs of a society of specialists.  
It is generally thought that the fragmentation of knowledge has been caused by the 
explosion in the quantity of knowledge. There is so much knowledge that no one 
can know all of it and hence unify it. This is a misconception. From the earliest 
times, specializations in medicine, architecture, agriculture, philosophy, etc. have 
been known and recognized as necessities. The presence of an occasional 
exceptional individual who could know it all (or have broad spectrum knowledge) is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the unity of knowledge.  
In fact, knowledge is unified by purpose. Having a sense of the broad outlines of 
human endeavor, and how it serves the human race, one can have an idea of how 
his/her efforts fit into this big picture. Current conceptions of science militate 
against this unity. Economists claim their discipline is “positive.” As scientists, they 
can only assess and explain the factual consequences that will result from different 
types of economic policies. Judging which policy is better or worse is a normative 
act, which should be left to policy makers. This type of insulation and fragmentation 
(which has nothing to do with the explosion of information) has disastrous 
consequences. If policies enrich a few and impoverish many, or damage the 
environment and profit the multinationals, or lead to debt and starvation in poor 
African countries, the economist has nothing to say about it in his status as a 
scientific economist. The physicist who works round the clock to produce an atom 
bomb claims that he is not responsible for how it is used. A biologist has discovered 
high yield varieties of rice which could feed the whole world. However, distribution, 
publicity, pushing for policies for adoption etc. are not within his specialty. Instead, 
if a multinational hires him for developing a variety that is not fertile (so that it will 
be able to sell new seeds every season), he will do the work for a salary, and not ask 
whether this development will be harmful to the interests of humanity as a whole.   
With increasing secularism, and the basing of knowledge on facts and reason alone, 
norms and values came to be regarded as unscientific. The glue of the common 
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purpose of service of humankind binds the strands of knowledge together. The idea 
that life arose by an accident and will perish in another accident denies all purpose to 
human existence and dissolves this glue, leading to the fragmentation of knowledge. 
Bertrand Russell (1903), a leading philosopher and architect of dominant modern 
worldviews has expressed himself poetically on this issue as follows: 
That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they 
were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves 
and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; 
that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve 
an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the 
devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, 
are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the 
whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the 
debris of a universe in ruins -- all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, 
are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to 
stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm 
foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be 
safely built.  
Abandonment of Mission of Character Building 
Reuben (1996) writes, “Late nineteenth century colleges had the explicit goal to 
build character and promote morality (understanding of duties to family, 
community, country and God) while at the same time contributing to the 
advancement of knowledge. These two goals proved to be incompatible.” In a 
historical process traced by Reuben, universities tried many different methods for 
character building before finally abandoning the goal and turning purely to the 
pursuit of knowledge. This historical study of development and evolution of 
Universities in the USA is an illuminating book, which contains many useful lessons 
for structuring higher education in Pakistan.  
Religious organizations were responsible for founding and funding the vast majority 
of colleges in the USA. Sectarian promotion policies were seen to lead to loss of 
academic excellence, and slowly abandoned in favor of tolerance. This policy of 
tolerance created a dilemma for promotion of morality. With faculty of differing 
religious views, character building and morality could not be promoted on the basis 
of a common religious platform. Instead, morality was bound to the “scientific 
method,” on the basis of the perception that: “teachers who did research would 
impart their enthusiasm to students. In addition, they would also impart the 
scientific values of unbiased observation, openness, tolerance, sincerity and 
commitment to students.”    Efforts were made to find scientific bases for religion 
and morality. Natural theology, apologetics, scientific justifications for moral 
principles, and many other intellectual endeavors were part of this movement. At 
the same time, the recognition that science was supposedly value free led the social 
sciences to increasingly distance themselves from values and norms. Instead of 
Zaman’s: Social Science Education      September 2008          131 
passionate advocacy of measures to promote human welfare, social sciences moved 
towards analytical, descriptive and detached observation. This move undercut 
efforts to base morality on science, and ultimately, after many efforts in different 
directions, the whole effort was abandoned in USA universities. 
Loss of the high moral purpose of universities has been sensed and regretted by many 
commentators. Many alternatives have been proposed and tried but none has proven 
successful. Thus students can learn how to manufacture atom bombs in modern 
universities, but not a word about the morality of killing and torture. The grave 
consequences of this have been graphically depicted in Glover (2001) in the form of 
countless atrocities committed in a world which has lost its moral bearings. Finding a 
solid basis for instilling morals in the coming generations is an urgent need, but it 
seems impossible in the Western context. Here in Pakistan, we have agreement on a 
religion, and therefore the same target is much easier to achieve. However, in imitating 
the Western educational system, we lose the possibility of doing so.   
Lessons for Social Science Education in Pakistan 
The main thrust of this essay has been to point out deficiencies in the Western 
Social Sciences, and suggest that blind imitation is not the route to improving social 
science education in Pakistan. Instead of advancing the discussion, this actually takes 
us back one step; we deny the efficacy of one simple, concrete, and often 
recommended plan of action, without having proposed any replacement. Improving 
social sciences in Pakistan would be a lot easier if it was just matter of sending 
enough students to the West to get their doctorates and then hiring them in local 
universities as teachers. This type of strategy has not worked fine in the Physical 
Sciences, not to speak of Social Sciences, for reasons already discussed. 
What then is the alternative? It is well known that imitating an existing technology is 
substantially easier than inventing a new one. Our discussion suggests that despite its 
difficulty, that is what is needed. Borrowing frames, concepts, analytical techniques, 
etc. from Western social sciences runs serious risks of imposing alien views on local 
problems. For example, the Marxist concept of conflicts between capitalists and 
labourers are deeply grounded in Marx’s observations of industrializing England, and 
attempts to impose these categories into the Pakistani context do violence to the 
ground realities of Pakistani society. Class struggles here occur along entirely different 
lines. Examples of this type could be multiplied. Our basic suggestion is to dispense 
entirely with the Western categories and concepts, and look at our own society, find 
our own prioritization for the problems which face us, and find our own solutions. In 
the process of solving real problems facing Pakistani society, we will automatically 
create a body of knowledge which we could label “social science.” This may well have 
categories of overlap and similarity with Western social sciences, but will also have its 
points of difference and singularities. Creation of a new set of sciences from scratch is 
a mammoth task, and daunted by this, many authors who came close to realizing the 
necessity of this backed away from grasping the full implications of their own analyses. 
Writings which debate these issues fall within the broad category of the project of 
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“Islamization of Knowledge” – see for example Al-Attas (1978) and Al-Faruqi (1982) 
– widely considered to be an important current need of Muslims.  
After having stated the main issue in a stark and blunt form, I would like to add some 
refinements and qualifications. Serious intellectual endeavor requires a substantial 
amount of discipline and training. Lest there be doubt, let me state that I am a great 
admirer of the intellectual traditions of the West. Training our scholars in Western 
social sciences would be a valuable investment, as it would provide them with 
experience in rigorous analysis and structured argumentation. While much of the 
substance of Western social sciences is derived from Western experiences and hence 
cannot be imported, the form of the analysis, the logical rigour and empirical 
orientation, are very much worth emulating. There is a lot we could learn from post-
Modernism, which develops an internal Western critique of much of Western social 
science. Our colleagues in India have done a lot of work on developing ‘subaltern 
studies,’ and many other disciplines where they have challenged Eurocentric views and 
developed and presented their own alternatives. Most importantly, we have our own 
tradition of Islamic scholarship, which has unsurpassed depth and complexity. 
Although it has been somnolent in the recent past, there are many signs of its revival. 
Extending and adapting this intellectual tradition to cope with modern problems 
would provide a methodology rooted in our own history, with a much better chance 
to flourish than alien implants. Just as our Islamic tradition has in the past been able to 
creatively borrow and adapt materials from Greeks, Indian, and many other 
intellectual corpora, there is no reason that we cannot absorb and assimilate relevant 
Western insights.    In closing, I would note that I have focused almost exclusively on 
one particular problem, the extent to which we may borrow from Western social 
sciences, in developing social sciences in Pakistan. A large number of other relevant 
issues have been ignored. Qureshi (1975) has given an excellent analysis of many of 
the dimensions of the problem at book length and suggested solutions. Even though 
the book is old, the problems discussed remain pretty much as described. It is sad that 
despite its crucial importance to the future of the nation, no real progress has been 
made towards solving these problems in decades.  
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